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█ Riassunto  Pensare l’identità come sé e corpo. Contributi recenti da fenomenologia, studi cognitivi e neuroscienze 
– Recentemente la fenomenologia ha intrapreso un dialogo sempre più intenso con le scienze cognitive, le neu-
roscienze e la psicopatologia, i cui punti-cardine sono stati: la struttura della coscienza e degli atti di coscienza; 
le diverse forme di consapevolezza di sé; l’investigazione del sé e dei suoi disturbi; l’intersoggettività. Due volu-
mi di recentemente pubblicazione attestano la prosperità di questo dibattito. Il primo – Body Memory, Me-
taphor, and Movement – verte sulla soggettività incarnata, rivolgendo particolare attenzione al fenomeno della 
memoria implicita del corpo e raccogliendo contributi provenienti dall’area fenomenologica, da quella delle 
scienze cognitive e delle terapie basate sull’embodiment. Il secondo – The Oxford Handbook of the Self – raccoglie 
contributi provenienti dalla ricerca fenomenologica, ma anche da quella cognitiva e psicopatologica, indagando il 
sé da prospettive diverse, come quella dell’esistenza corporea, della formazione dell’identità personale, 
dell’indagine metafisica, della dimensione morale e delle patologie del sé. In questa sede si intende passare critica-
mente in rassegna questi volumi, discutendone l’impatto teorico sulla corrente ricerca fenomenologica e cognitiva. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Identità; Memoria corporea; Intersoggettività; Individualità; Processi cerebrali. 
 
█ Abstract  In recent years, phenomenology has increasingly engaged in dialogue with the cognitive sciences, 
the neurosciences, and psychopathology. In particular, the foci of this debate are: the structure of consciousness 
and conscious acts, the different forms of self-awareness, inquiry concerning the self and its disturbances, and 
intersubjectivity. Two recent volumes bear witness to this flourishing debate. The first one – Body Memory, 
Metaphor, and Movement – deals with the issue of embodied subjectivity and is particularly concerned with the 
phenomenon of implicit body memory with a collection of contributions from phenomenology, the cognitive 
sciences, and embodied therapies. The second one – The Oxford Handbook of the Self – brings together contri-
butions from phenomenological, cognitive, and psychopathological research and addresses the topic of the Self 
from the diverse standpoints expressed by these areas of studies. The issue of the Self is analyzed with regard to 
various perspectives such as bodily existence, the formation of personal identity, metaphysical inquiry, the 
moral dimension and pathologies of the self. The essay aims to provide a critical assessment of these volumes 
and to discuss their theoretical impact on current phenomenological and cognitive research. 
KEYWORDS: Selfhood; Bodily Memory; Intersubjectivity; Individuality; Brain Processes. 
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IF ONE IS LOOKING FOR A DEFINITIVE over-
coming of Cartesian dualism in the field of 
philosophical research, one has to consider the 
recent volume edited by Sabine C. Koch, 
Thomas Fuchs, Michela Summa and Cornelia 
Müller,1 which represents a very rich volume on 
the topic of the body. 
Starting from Merleau-Ponty’s conception 
of the body as a living and dynamic structure of 
the subject, the authors propose a multidisci-
plinary reading of bodily experience covering 
the ambits of phenomenology, the cognitive 
sciences and embodied therapies. In this way, 
the presented study is neither a mere theoreti-
cal reflection on the bodily aspects of life nor a 
simple collection of empirical data lacking any 
conceptual framework. On the contrary, the 
volume succeeds in combining the main in-
sights of a solid philosophical background, i.e. 
the phenomenological one, with both the most 
recent findings on the neurophysiology of the 
body and the medical application of such scien-
tific results. 
Thomas Fuchs, whose studies on the Leib-
gedächtnis serve as both the chief inspiration 
and a reference-point for many contributions 
in the book, presents the basic features of a 
phenomenological interpretation of the special 
phenomenon of body memory.2 The first as-
sumption for being able to confer to the body 
the capacity of remembering is enlarging the 
notion of memory beyond the sole act of men-
tal recollection. Starting from the idea of the 
body as a living formation able to store – i.e. to 
embody – its own past experiences such as 
movement and perception, referring by doing 
so to French thinkers such as de Biran, Ravais-
son, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty, Fuchs pro-
poses a notion of body memory as «the totality 
of these bodily capacities, habits, and disposi-
tions as they have developed in the course of 
one’s life».3  
Jointing the Merleau-Ponty’s notion of op-
erative intentionality, which plays a crucial role 
in the formation of habitualities, with the more 
recent finding of the implicit memory by cogni-
tive psychology, Fuchs shows how the remem-
bering by body doesn’t entail a representation 
of the past, but rather its re-activation within 
the present performances of the body. The 
past, as once lived, can be re-lived through and 
by the body, which can re-enact the already ac-
quired behaviors and experiences putting them 
in new current context. 
The liveliness of the body allows avoiding a 
static recovering of the lived past, since it in-
volves precisely the actualization of the past 
event in connection with the present surround-
ings; here the body doesn’t experience a sense 
of disorientation and unfamiliarity, but rather 
it finds inside of itself, i.e. inside of the devel-
oped history of its own articulations, the re-
sources to face the novelties and «to make our-
selves feel at home in situations».4 
Though he openly refers to the kinds of 
body memory described by Edward Casey, i.e. 
habitual, traumatic, and erotic, Fuchs makes 
this tripartition even wider by casting the re-
membering by the body into different albeit 
intertwining levels of experience. The six pro-
posed forms can be coupled according to their 
common root lying either in the spatiotemporal 
dimension, or in the intersubjective situation or 
finally in the suffering condition of the body.  
This procedural memory is based upon the 
individual’s sensorimotor and kinesthetic abili-
ties to perform a series of exercises lasting and 
repeating through time; such a memory inserts 
itself into the broader context of spatiality sur-
rounding the body that allows developing a sit-
uational memory as well. Both temporal and 
spatial, the body doesn’t live in isolation from 
others, but quite the contrary it experiences be-
ing continuously related to others; this leads 
the body to build up an implicit style of relating 
to others along with a habituality for posturing 
in front of others, both capacities aiming at de-
veloping an embodied personality grounded on 
the intercorporeal memory.  
This pre-reflective skill of own body to con-
tinuously refer to others is linked to the other 
side of same process, i.e. the corresponding 
predisposition to shape bodily behaviors and 
roles started by others through a continuous 
process of imitation and identification called by 
Fuchs incorporative memory. By the contact 
Thinking of Identity as Self and Body 
 
85 
with others the last two forms of body memory 
derive too: on the basis of an experience which 
led us to feel suffering, one usually develops a 
pain memory, which plays the role of avoiding a 
recurrence of the already lived experience 
through recognition of a situation or a person 
somehow referable to the pain experienced in 
the past.  
Once such a suffering becomes harder and 
heavier, it assumes the shape of a real trauma 
triggering the consequent traumatic memory 
which, although one may try to confine it in the 
deeper areas of oneself, remerges unwillingly 
every time the current situation succeeds in re-
activating the embodied references of the 
traumatically lived experiences.  
As a conclusion of his essay, Fuchs stresses 
the relevance of body memory and of its differ-
ent forms in the construction of current experi-
ence. Given its lack of any medial shape of rec-
ollections such as images or words, the body 
memory stands for an immediate and abrupt 
re-entering of the past into the present, which 
gets continuously reconstituted on the basis of 
the bodily re-enacted experiences of the em-
bodied subject.  
The conceptually basic presentation by 
Thomas Fuchs of the notion of body memory 
is further developed in its main theoretical im-
plications by both Michela Summa and Maxine 
Sheets-Johnstone.  
Michela Summa deals with the implications 
of body memory in the formation of the mean-
ing on a perceptual level, referring to the phe-
nomenological presuppositions of the idea of a 
remembering by body.5 In her contribution, the 
author explicitly aims at comparing the phe-
nomenological approach to the experientialist 
one worked out by Lakoff and Johnson.    
Although the experientialism too is based 
on the assumption of the role played by bodily 
features in the constitution of meaning, such a 
theory emphasizes the rootedness of the mean-
ing in the signs and its physical location in the 
neural structure of the brain. In this way, as 
Summa remarks, one can easily understand 
«that this definition deeply conflicts with the 
phenomenological theory of meaning», be-
cause, «neglecting the ideality of meaning, it 
makes a mistake analogous to the one made by 
psychologism with respect to the pure logic, but 
also because it goes a step further than psychol-
ogism by reducing meaning to the factual and 
material structure of the human brain».6  
A different perspective, according to the au-
thor, can be proposed by adopting a phenome-
nological stance, on which basis one can ap-
proach the bodily perception referring not only 
to the neurobiological laws that determine any 
common perceiving like, for instance, seeing 
the sky, but also and above all to the layer of 
givenness of perceptual experience, which goes 
beyond the mere physical level.  
Recalling an example made by Lakoff and 
Johnson themselves, Summa states that the fact 
that seeing the blue of the sky doesn’t mean the 
sky has the trait of blue, doesn’t involve reduc-
ing the whole experience of seeing the blue sky 
to the neural circuits enabling such a percep-
tion.  
Precisely the bodily dimension of such a 
perceiving lies at the basis, as to the meaning-
fulness of this experiencing, of the scientifically 
detailed explanation of seeing the sky as blue. 
By recurring to the notion of body memory, 
Summa aims at showing how the ambiguity of 
the body, characterized by Husserlian defini-
tion as «the “turning-point” (Umschlagstelle) 
between sense and natural causality»,7 allows 
rendering experientially accessible the constitu-
tion of meaning within the embodied subject. 
The reference to the experience is by no 
means accidental, since the author, according 
to the phenomenological standpoint adopted, 
highlights both the ideality of meaning, i.e. its 
irreducibility to the factual happening, and the 
temporal-genetic layer of the constitution of 
meaning, i.e. its stemming from the life-worldly 
history of the subject of experience and not 
from a purely formal universe of signification. 
In order to develop her account, Summa joints 
the notion of body memory to the Husserlian 
concept of Typus. The latter means the inner 
connection of the constituting synthesis that 
underlies any sensible experience: multiple data 
coming from different realms of sensation, e.g. 
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touch, vision, taste, can be unified in a single 
Typus of perceived object, which repeats itself 
in any further similar experience.  
The possibility of iterating the same type 
for diverse objects grounds on the continuous 
reactivation of such a type in various contexts. 
As such, the Typus is not properly a concept, 
rather it anticipates and enables the formation 
of a concept, since it is rooted in the passive 
synthetic process underlying the mental activi-
ties of the experiencer. Basing on the remarks 
by Dieter Lohmar, Summa stresses the similari-
ty between the Husserlian notion of Typus and 
the Kantian one of Schema.  
Like the latter, the former has a synthetic 
trait, working to give rules to the multiplicity of 
experience, thus allowing the perception of 
something. But, contrary to Kant’s schema, 
thought as a medium enabling the application 
of categories to reality, Husserl’s type deals 
with the genetic constitution of meaning and its 
phenomenology «aims at defining the process-
es that make possible the institution, the sedi-
mentation, and the reactivation of familiar per-
ceptual patterns».8  
The passive, synthetic layer of constitution 
is precisely what allows connecting the notion 
of Typus to the one of body memory: the con-
stant reiteration of the same traits in different 
objects stems from the traces past experiences 
left in the bodily features of the experiencing 
subject. The habitualization of diverse percep-
tions is made possible by the temporal associa-
tions of synthetic processes that stand for both 
a trait of bodily memory and the mark of typo-
logical apprehension.  
This complex interplay between the body as 
intentional networks of experience and the 
type as steady generalization of the individuali-
ties of these experiences permits us to trace the 
formation of meaning back not to its neural ba-
sis, but rather to its transcendental origin in the 
subject living in a constant relation with her 
own surroundings. As «a pre-categorial struc-
ture organizing our experience», the types 
«are experiential patterns stemming from our 
intentional relatedness to the world, and their 
intentional constitution can be reflectively 
brought to consciousness and be thematized»9.  
The genetic background of the work per-
formed by body memory is even more stressed 
in the reflections by Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, 
who deals with the dynamics of bodily move-
ment as the basis of kinetic memory.10 Starting 
from the inquiries worked out by both Fuchs 
and Jeannerod, the author emphasizes the pri-
mality of the motility of ourselves in compari-
son to other physical skills such as vision or 
hearing, since it is not possible to close the kin-
esthesia off, i.e. to deprive ourselves, even 
though temporarily, of our capacity to move.  
If we experience such an incapability, we 
find ourselves in the realm of pathology: «pa-
thology apart, the dynamics of our own move-
ment, an awareness of our body-in-motion is 
an insuppressible fact of life».11 To be insup-
pressible means not being subject to a concep-
tual operation of division, like in the case of 
other kinds of memory that undergo a taxon-
omy based on a dichotomist procedure. On the 
contrary, the kinesthetic memory being linked 
to the original motility of our life can be inves-
tigated according to a holistic inquiry following 
the spontaneous dynamics of the body.  
Such dynamics are clearly recognizable in 
what Lurija calls the kinetic melody of the learn-
ing performance such as for instance writing, 
dancing or other similar motor activities, in 
which the iteration of the practice takes the 
basic shape of an introjected automatism by 
remembering. As Luria shows, given some neu-
rophysiological conditions for executing a 
normal kinesthetic apprehension, memory as 
motility is inscribed in the body and furnishes 
the dynamic patterns enabling the potentiali-
ties of the subject’s doing – the I can.  
The inscription of the melodic kinetic 
memory inside the body involves highlighting 
the spontaneity, i.e. the automatism of such a 
form of memory, which occurs along the flow-
ing of temporal experience; once instantiated, 
the movement flows in its turn within the gen-
eral flowing of corporeal living and by doing so 
it goes forth becoming ever more familiar as a 
constitutive part of our personal development. 
Though she puts the emphasis on the automa-
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tization of basic movements, Sheets-Johnstone 
warns about the risk of conceiving such a mo-
tility as a mechanization, what would happen 
using the term “motor” to describe it.  
This term, according to the author, is not 
able to reveal the living dimension of bodily 
self-movement, since it reductively refers to an 
inner force fully mechanical without any refer-
ence to the body as an organism rather than a 
machine. The conceptual solidness of the no-
tion of kinesthetic is due to its adherence to 
both the experiential and neurological layers of 
the subject matter, since, by referring to the 
temporal feature of melodic memory, it suc-
ceeds in describing the whole process of con-
tinuous learning by a bodily organism.  
Both Merleau-Ponty’s conceptions of  habit 
and of body image and Gallagher’s and Cole’s 
views of body schema lack this fundamental 
reference to the living core of reality, for they 
are based on conceptual constructs missing the 
very contact with the experience. It depends on 
what the author calls «a bias of Western 
thought that anchors the reality in the spatiality 
of things to the exclusion of their temporali-
ty»,12 according to a pointillist explanation ig-
noring the dynamic layer of bodily perfor-
mance.  
Such a layer is instead well-grasped by a 
phenomenological account of the body meant 
as a form of life, a natural-born-mover, wherein 
to act and to be affected are two sides of the 
same coin, both meaning the way in which the 
body remembers by moving and so it constant-
ly develops a dynamic, i.e. living, self.  
The contribution by Elizabeth Behnke re-
lates the traumatic memory mentioned by 
Fuchs to the kinesthetic memory Sheets-
Johnstone dealt with.13 The author starts by 
carefully offering a philological explanation of 
the term enduring, which means both the ca-
pacity to suffer and the lasting of such a capaci-
ty. Compared with the analogous term in Ger-
man and with its origin in Latin and Indo-
European languages, the notion of enduring 
aims at phenomenologically describing our skill 
to withstand a traumatic experience while it is 
occurring and, by doing so, to re-shape our own 
body living such a persistent experience. 
The kinesis of this peculiar phenomenon is 
fundamental to better understand it: during a 
painful experience, the body reacts according 
to a double movement of driving away from 
the pain and of moving closer to oneself. By do-
ing so, one «creates a zone of tension whose 
lived meaning is that of attempting to establish 
and maintain a boundary, not just for a mo-
ment, but in a sustained effort of self-
preservation».14 In case of a pain that structur-
ally damages the personal integrity, one can 
speak of “boundary violation”, which describes 
the experience of a trauma meant as a breach 
within his/her own constitutive temporality.  
Precisely with regard to the temporal struc-
ture of enduring, Behnke grounds her reflec-
tions on the phenomenological account of time 
referring especially to Husserl’s latest manu-
scripts. Already in action in a normal, i.e. non 
traumatic, experience, the threefold feature of 
time as retention-impression-protention works 
also as the trauma arises. As a violation of the 
usual temporal flowing, the traumatic event 
breaks the common passage from the past via 
present to the future, since it indefinitely ex-
tends the current situation transforming the 
“now” from a transit-phase to an enduring 
condition: «in such an experience, the open 
world may collapse into a here and now from 
which I cannot escape – all that is left of the 
temporal horizon is the leading edge of the now 
(in Husserl’s terms, the “protentional” dimen-
sion of the living present), the very moment 
where the violation is ongoingly main-
tained».15  
Given the permanent state yielded by trau-
ma, one is no longer able to project a future, but 
she has only to withstand with her own bodily 
skills a lasting event that occurs right in the 
same body as a temporal-kinetic structured one 
comprising both its origin and its resistance. 
Like in a sort of continuous process of self-
transformation, the temporality of the traumat-
ic experience, which is founded in the natural 
articulation of the body and develops thanks to 
it, can be overcome precisely by appealing to 
the same temporal structure allowing it.  
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Through what Behnke calls a «restorative 
embodiment work» meant as a «mode of so-
matic education»,16 which is different than a 
therapy, she states that one must try to find in 
herself the resources to change this enduring 
condition of trauma re-opening to the future 
the violated boundary. It is about getting pos-
session again of her own body by living-
consciously-through it, i.e. to refer to her own 
temporalization as a self-temporalization, a 
process that we are not only undergoing, but 
can also lead towards a different situation than 
the current one. It involves the overcoming of 
enduring as a mere withstanding of a re-
enacting of the normal threefold flux as reten-
tional, impressional, and protensional.17 
The close connection between the bodily 
dimension of subjectivity and her mental activ-
ities is especially stressed by Christina Bermeit-
inger and Markus Kiefer, who propose the idea 
of a corporeal location of theoretical notions.18 
Starting with a presentation of the so-called 
“amodal” theories of knowledge, which con-
ceive of the concepts as abstract mental entities 
having no reference to perceptual and motor 
areas, the authors offer the alternative idea of 
the “modality-specific” theory, according to 
which the «conceptual representations are 
grounded in perceptual and motor representa-
tions», what is also called the «embodiment 
approach».19 This is based on a series of as-
sumptions the authors quote from Margaret 
Wilson’s well-known article from 2002,20 i.e. 
the being situated of cognition, its time-
relation, the openness to the environment 
meant as a part of the cognitive system, the link 
to the action, and the bodily reenactment of 
knowledge.  
Precisely the last feature highlighted is pre-
sented more in detailed by Bermeitinger and 
Kiefer, who stress, on the basis of recent empir-
ical findings, the crucial role played by the re-
activation of motor and perceptual processing 
in the development of conceptual activities. 
The construction of meaning finds itself at the 
end of a genetic route begun with the bodily 
storing of representations that re-emerge at lat-
er times triggered by precise stimuli in (also 
simulated) situations.  
The reference to the peculiar situation al-
lows emphasizing a second basic mark of the 
embodied cognition, i.e. the being-situated of 
concepts, a trait that becomes clear if one looks 
at the concomitance of the activation of a con-
cept and of the co-emergence of representa-
tions of associated states.  
This constant orientation of any concept, 
even if it means abstract entities like “truth” or 
“freedom”, to the context both current and 
past, wherein the concept gets thought, is a fur-
ther evidence of the role played by the body as 
an aggregation of sensorimotor systems in the 
theoretical activity of the subject. To be rooted 
in a surrounding that takes part in the for-
mation of our conceptual life means to think in 
order to act in such a surrounding.  
Being dependent on a bodily existence con-
tinuously networking with its context, the con-
cepts «are supposed to essentially enhance our 
interaction with objects in the environment»21 
and, in order to do this, they have to flexibly 
adjust themselves to the current situation. Far 
from being a fixed and atemporal abstraction, a 
concept stems from the neural processes devel-
oping in the sensory and motor systems and 
inscribes itself in the history of the body, both 
present and past, and for this reason the em-
bodiment approach is able to offer a clearer ex-
planation of what concepts are and what they 
are for. 
The relevance of the bond between cogni-
tion and action is plainly highlighted by Chris-
tina Jung and Peggy Sparenberg, who ground 
their reflections on the mirror mechanisms of 
the brain to show how the individual’s cogni-
tive behavior is inherently linked to acting to-
wards others.22 Both in the case of the imitation 
process instantiated by mirror neurons and in 
the correlated phenomenon of the understand-
ing of other intentions, it is clear to what extent 
the bodily foundation of cognition makes it a 
higher level of an action already in place.  
The authors observe that such an action-
based development of cognitive performance is 
evident in the constant tendency not only to 
imitate and to understand others, but also to 
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anticipate, i.e. to foresee other behaviors in a 
dynamic-temporal context, in which «there is a 
time delay which needs to be bridged by predic-
tion […] allowing an individual to react quickly 
and successfully in our environment».23 The 
reference to the role played by the mirroring in 
the neural processes allows the author to en-
large the consideration of bodily interaction to 
the sphere of emotions. The neural basis of 
empathy is well-proven by a series of empirical 
studies stressing the relevance of the stimula-
tion of certain parts of the body to trigger spe-
cific relational reactions like smiling.  
Moreover, the bodily location of emotions 
is also shown by the close connection between 
the emergence of memories of past events and 
the stimulus of the corresponding part of the 
body involved in the original occurrence of 
such event. The constant activation of bodily 
mechanisms in conjunction with the encounter 
with others attests to the crucial role played by 
the intersubjective context for the formation of 
the self as a physical self, according to a double 
process of overlapping and distinction worth 
studying, considering that «being in a social 
setting modifies our cognition in order to ena-
ble us to communicate and interact with the 
humans beings around us».24  
A contribution by diverse authors such as 
Caterina Suitner, Sabine C. Koch, Katarina 
Bachmeier, and Anne Maass (Dynamic 
emobodiment and its functional role) recovers in 
a certain manner the main topics previously 
discussed like embodied cognition, body 
memory, and bodily dynamics in order to cast 
them in an empirical framework of findings.25 
Basing on the general assumption that «it is 
difficult to even argue for a mental process that 
is not in some way grounded in physical experi-
ence»,26 the authors go forth to illustrate the 
functioning of bodily dimension of experience 
in both on-line attitudes and off-line attitudes.  
With regard to the former, the authors refer 
to the categories of “smooth” and “sharp” 
rhythms as influencing the movement qualities. 
Several experiments have shown that personal 
judgments as either positive or negative on 
some valence-free signs are decisively deter-
mined by the kind of approach – smooth or 
sharp – that contextually affects the individual. 
In the case of a series of movements shaped by 
smooth rhythm approaching the individual 
under observation, he/she performs a corre-
sponding series of positive judgments on the 
signs he/she is looking at; whereas the pushing 
away of smooth movement rhythms deter-
mines a decreasing of positive valuing, the 
sharp movements revoke any effect of motor 
behavior on attitudes.  
The research explains the influence these 
kinds of movement have on everyday life: 
while the individual affected by smooth 
movements can focus on something through a 
process of “body feedback” enabled by an in-
dulging, relaxed state, once she is involved in 
sharp movements creating tension and a 
fighting condition, the individual, although she 
remains related to something, no longer experi-
ences any meaning of it.  
Precisely the role played in the formation of 
meaning shows to what extent such a dichoto-
my smooth/sharp rhythms intervenes in the 
interpersonal relationships, considering «that 
movement qualities (e.g. movement rhythms 
implemented via handshakes) may affect per-
son perception in affect and judgment of per-
sonality characteristics».27  
The influence by the kind of motor stimula-
tion on the formation of valuing is also verified 
in those experiments dealing with an off-line 
state of attitude. According to the experiments’ 
findings, the participants put in the condition 
of light movements or light position of some 
parts of the body were led to perform a positive 
memory in comparison with the ones set in a 
condition of strong movements or strong posi-
tion of some parts of the body.  
In a further step, unifying the two sides of 
the experiments, i.e. the on-line and the off-line 
status of experience, Suitner and her co-authors 
insert the outcomes of quoted observations in 
the wider conceptual framework of the theory 
of “Spatial Agency Bias” (SAB). Such a theory 
concerns the systematic predisposition to de-
scribe events according to his/her own cultural 
way of writing, i.e. left-right, like in the West-
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ern culture, or right-left, like for instance in Ar-
abic one.  
A number of tests demonstrated that the di-
rection of writing causes a mental schema, 
which is valid for and spontaneously applied to 
the realm of action. Stereotypes according to 
which one judges an hypothetical occurrence in 
its development stem from the cultural mark of 
writing: in the examples proposed by the au-
thors, an Italian or English style writer places 
the aggressor to the left and the victim to the 
right, or depicts a man (meant as a greater 
agency according to a masculine bias) as pro-
ceeding rightward from the participant’s per-
spective.  
The same observations showed that such a 
predisposed representations can disappear and 
even faintly upturn if the participants undergo 
a motor activity training opposite to their own. 
It proves both the bodily rootedness of the usu-
al judging and meaning and the role played by 
the single situation for the emerging of the off-
line embodied skills, considering that to be an 
embodied subject means living in and through 
a body as a dynamic reality immersed in social, 
cultural and historical surroundings.  
The being situated of the body is empha-
sized as a basis of her reflections by Claudia 
Böger (Metaphorical instruction and body 
memory), who focuses the attention on the me-
dial role played by the bodily layer between the 
corporeal-worldly dimension and the mental 
one.28 Starting from this assumption, the au-
thor identifies in the nexus of the individual 
and the environment the source of the arising 
of meaningful experience, which has to be con-
ceptually, i.e. metaphorically, translated «into 
concrete terms, which are grounded on the sen-
sory-motor-system […]. This means that em-
bodied experiences in movements of the indi-
vidual can build the basis of a learning pro-
cess».29 Recalling one of the guiding statements 
of the volume, Böger stresses in turn the dy-
namic structure of bodily dimension as the 
condition for developing an empirically in-
formed theory of meaning.  
The consideration of the body’s inborn mo-
tility allows revolving the research around the 
overlapping of language and experience. Refer-
ring to a series of tests, the author shows how 
the suggestion to tie a mechanical gesture (like 
tapping a castanet) to an empathic way to per-
form it (identifying with the click) helps the 
timing of the execution. Such an outcome 
proves the contextual frame of the subject’s do-
ing, who inserts her action in the environment 
meant as a location worth being exploited to 
better perform. Through orders stimulating the 
experiential feeling of subjective being-situated, 
the metaphorical way to instruct the partici-
pants improves their way of executing.30   
According to this perspective, the experi-
ence stands for the basic domain on which one 
can elaborate any further inquiries. To refer to 
the experience involves addressing its bodily 
level as the meeting point of language and 
meaning, both considered as embodied process-
es. The notion of “image schemata” intended as 
«the format (but not the content) for execut-
ing movement and articulating meaning», rep-
resents the medial locus for the formation of 
learning courses, since they are “cognitive pat-
terns” able to be «modified during life, both 
perceptually in action and in simulation pro-
cesses (in respect to imagined bodily ac-
tion)».31  
The recourse to the concept of the schema, 
differently criticized by both Summa and 
Sheets-Johnstone, has a positive validity in 
Böger, who means it not as a fixed structure of 
the mind nor as an abstract theoretical presup-
position, but rather as a dynamic feature of an 
embodied subject dealing with an environment 
changing continuously.  
Whereas Böger stresses the relevance of the 
relationship between bodily layer and worldly 
dimension, Christine Caldwell starts with the 
basic assumption of the unity of body-mind 
and the interconnection of different bodily sys-
tems: «all parts of the body form a network of 
mutual influence and interdependence, and to-
gether they produce the mind».32 The continu-
ity of such interaction is well-proven in the 
phenomenon of body memory, both explicit 
(through words and images) and implicit 
(through engrams bodily enacted).  
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The two kinds of memory can emerge ei-
ther singly or together following in both cases 
the fundamental principle of the association, 
according to which «if one sensory element of 
a memory is currently present, a whole network 
of associations will be called up along with it, 
and the new situation will be deemed a match 
to that memory».33  
Though similar as regards the associative 
process for coming out, explicit memory and 
implicit memory differ with respect to their 
characterizing hallmark: in the explicit course 
of remembering, time plays the crucial role of 
tracing the past events back until the current 
moment, while in the implicit procedure of 
memory the emotions allow both encoding and 
retrieving what has elapsed.  
Developed according to a purely physiolog-
ical process involving amygdala, hypothalamus, 
hippocampus, and basal forebrain, emotional 
memory occurs especially in an intensively 
lived experience and its recovering doesn’t de-
pend on a verbal retrieval of past situations, but 
rather on a psychotherapeutic setting able to 
act on the subject’s affective states.  
In this way, psychotherapy becomes a di-
mension, in which the patient learns to re-
experience the past events which took place 
through her own body according to a process of 
«re-membering or re-embodying memory», 
i.e. a memory re-living in light of the current 
therapeutic present the elapsed time.34 In order 
to induce the process of bodily remembering, 
the therapist stimulates the patient to re-enact 
the right hemisphere, devoted to non-verbal 
experiencing, bypassing or postponing the left 
hemisphere dealing with language and with a 
timing that doesn’t match with the often puz-
zled past of emotional life.35  
Through a gradual process of re-
appropriation of her own bodily past, the pa-
tient is led to form new memories and to re-live 
them with a recovered awareness. It is about a 
re-shaping of herself and of her identity by a 
long and careful work addressed to the motor 
systems of the body directly.  
All of the contributions discussed above 
share, firstly, thinking of body as a privileged 
form of subjectivity, and secondly conceiving 
of formation of subjectivity as self-identity 
through memory. As this regard it is worth to 
bring up the brief though very instructive text 
by Ralf Meyer, who, from a purely neurobiolog-
ical standpoint, offers a careful description of 
neural processes of remembering as aiming at 
forming the personal self.36  
Such a basic reference to the selfhood is 
mainly due to the philosophical setting of the 
volume as a whole, according to which the pro-
posed approach, denoted by the editors in their 
Conclusion as both “transdisciplinary” and “in-
terdisciplinary”,37 though it promotes the inte-
gration with cognitive fields and clinical am-
bits, inscribes both domains in the broader 
conceptual framework of phenomenology.  
Far from being a weak point of the study, 
this openly phenomenological background of 
analysis allows recognizing a clear clue that 
leads all contributions in the respect of their 
single differences, i.e. the notion of body 
memory meant as a part, though fundamental, 
for the more general issue, phenomenologically 
central, of the constitution of subjectivity.  
For this reason, it can be useful and enlight-
ening to compare and contrast the reflections 
worked out by Fuchs and his co-authors to the 
ones recently proposed in a volume edited by 
Shaun Gallagher that addresses the question of 
the self specifically.38 The notion of the self, 
which underlies though sometimes not explicit-
ly the analyses proposed by Fuchs and his co-
authors, is the central issue of the rich volume 
proposed by Gallagher, who offered already in 
the recent past other contributions on such 
topic.  
The richness of Gallagher’s proposal is 
clearly shown by the diverse perspectives 
through which each author faces the notion of 
the self: phenomenological, metaphysical, neu-
rological, clinical, social, moral, among related 
others. Gallagher himself, in his contribution 
written along with Kai Vogeley, approaches the 
subject matter putting it within a neuroscien-
tific framework.39  
What does it mean to refer to neurosci-
ence’s observations in order to talk about the 
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self? Evidently, one must not look for the self, 
as if the self were something located in a specif-
ic area of the brain. Rather, the search for the 
self in the brain means identifying both those 
areas and the processes of the brain, in which 
something like a “sense of the self” emerges; it 
is about all of the mental states such as “think-
ing of”, “being aware of”, “feeling” one-self. 
Quoting the most recent findings in the fields 
of neuroimaging and neurophysiology, the au-
thors highlight the central role played by the 
cortical midline structures (CMS) and especial-
ly by the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in de-
veloping self-experiences.  
The extensive nature of the CSM, on the 
other hand, indicates that there is no special-
ized area apt to form a sense of the self, but ra-
ther that such a sense can stem from different 
parts of the brain performing in different ways 
the same function (right hemisphere, left hemi-
sphere, anterior cingulate cortex, among oth-
ers). The fact that these numerous areas of the 
brain appear to be involved in the processes of 
self-representation doesn’t entail that the sense 
of the self is tied only to experiences of self-
reference.  
Several times the same areas implicated in 
the self-experiencing get going referring not to 
the self, but to the other, to objects and even to 
purely logical mental reasoning. This means 
that these areas «are in fact not areas of activa-
tion exclusively for self. At first it seemed the 
self was almost everywhere in the brain; now it 
seems to be nowhere».40 
To escape from this impasse, Vogeley and 
Gallagher propose to consider the neuroscien-
tific findings on the basis of a phenomenological 
assumption, according to which one can distin-
guish between a “sense of ownership” and a 
“sense of agency” both relating to the notion of 
“minimal self”. Such a notion describes the 
primal, immediate sense of the self, i.e. the one 
bound to the bodily dimension of experience.  
As the pre-reflective, implicit layer of self-
experience, this minimal sense of subjectivity 
emerges not in the dimension of narration or 
self-construction, which is an extended shape 
of the minimal one, but rather in the direct feel-
ing (ownership) of our own body meant as 
moving, suffering, enjoying body, and in the 
related sensation of oneself as the one who is 
acting (agency).  
On the basis of these primitive and pre-
rational senses of self the upper level of narra-
tive self (reporting on his/her owning and act-
ing) develops. It is worth stressing that the phe-
nomenological assumption regarding the self 
intertwines with the notion of bodily self and in 
this way it openly recalls, though without quot-
ing it, the phenomenology of the body proposed 
by Fuchs and his colleagues.  
Basing the inquiry on neuroscientific tests 
doesn’t guarantee a complete correspondence 
between theoretical statements and empirical 
outcomes. On the contrary, the experimental 
sides of inquiry sometimes seems to contradict 
or at least to put in question the conceptual in-
sights. It is precisely what happens to the au-
thors as regards the observations put forward 
by Farrer and Frith, to which they clearly refer 
for the notions of sense of ownership and sense 
of agency. The latter especially becomes ques-
tionable if meant as a sense of acting simulta-
neous to the action: according to the studies by 
Farrer and Frith, it looks like this sense emerges 
not during the realization of the act, i.e. it is not 
tied to motor control, but rather to what is 
achieved by the action, i.e. to its consequence.  
Once recognized such a mismatch between 
their theoretical insights and the research’s re-
sults they themselves refer to, Vogeley and Gal-
lagher transform this critical point of inquiry 
into a stimulus to probe the agency of the self 
more deeply towards «a multifactorial and 
multilevel model [that] appears to provide the 
most helpful and comprehensible framework 
for integrating divergent theories and find-
ings».41  
In order to build this multilayer model of 
the self, the authors shift the attention from the 
sole internal states to the ecological dimension 
of self-experience. In this way, the inquiry fo-
cuses on the spatiality and the sociality of the 
self, which constitute a field of observation able 
to show the continuous interaction between the 
first person perspective and the third person 
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perspective along with the involvement from 
time to time of different areas of the brain. The 
openness to the world as a network of relation-
ships allows conceiving the self as a subject of 
multiple experiences rebounding on the cere-
bral features of the individual.  
According to this perspective, one should 
study «what happens in the brain when the 
self-as-subject is engaged in the world, in spe-
cific actions and in specific social contexts»,42 
based on an interpretation that, though 
grounded on the sharpest neurophysiological 
experiments, doesn’t renounce putting such re-
sults in a wider conceptual, i.e. philosophical, 
framework. 
The bodily dimension of selfhood from a 
phenomenological standpoint is proposed by 
Dorothée Legrand, who opens her contribution 
talking about the distinction between “self-as-
object” and “self-as-subject” Gallagher and Vo-
geley dealt with.43 The self-as-subject is that 
part of experience that cannot be eliminated, 
i.e. merely objectified, and that is always con-
sciously lived.  
Such assumptions lead to the statement that 
subjectivity expresses herself through inten-
tionality, though the subject is not reducible to 
her intentional traits considering the possible 
intransitive states of the subject (an action 
without reference to an object). This double 
level of differentiation/relation between sub-
jective and intentional sides of one and the same 
experience presents the difficulty to justify the 
emergence of a coherent experiencing, in which 
the subject constitutes as intentional and at the 
same time is constituted as intentional. Legrand 
finds in the body the existential dimension of 
the self able to address the Husserlian paradox 
of subjectivity as both a subject for and an ob-
ject in the world.  
The way to make clear such a paradox goes 
through the body considering that the corpore-
al being of individual means as such his/her 
worldly being. Referring to prominent scholars 
who emphasized the bodily nature of living in 
conjunction with its worldly nature, such as de 
Biran, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Henry, the 
author aims at overcoming the idea of a body 
as a pattern of the world; it would involve put-
ting the body and world on two separate 
though interconnected levels, according to a 
schema in which the body experiences the 
world by a mediating contact.  
On the contrary, Legrand proposes to read 
the relation body-world as co-happening, since 
both body and world, at the level of conscious-
ness’ experience, «belong to one and a single 
act of consciousness, constituted by two irre-
ducible but inseparable modes of givenness 
(the bodily subjectivity and the intentionality 
of experience)».44 The notion allowing to bring 
together the subjective and the intentional 
forms of experiencing is the one of body as a 
“volume”, i.e. as an entity present in the world 
that, given its localized and oriented nature, 
permits the subject to relate to the environ-
ment.  
It is about a very peculiar medium: it is a re-
ality constitutively rooted in the world and at 
the same time it hosts a network of mental pro-
cesses. As such, the body allows the subject to 
experience the world without becoming a visi-
ble part of this experience; the body remains 
«transparent in the sense that one experiences 
the world through it».45 Its trait of voluminosi-
ty, i.e. being a conscious though not directly ob-
jectified presence, makes the body something 
different than the Husserlian zero-point of ori-
entation, since «I experience this volume as 
oriented subjectively by an act of consciousness 
[…]» though «[…] I experience this subjective 
orientation without taking it as an intentional 
object of my experience».46  
In this perspective, being directed towards 
the outer world doesn’t involve the unaware-
ness of oneself as experiencer, but I become 
conscious of my-self as subject of experiencing 
precisely thanks to this transparent bodily con-
dition of such an experiencing.  
Therefore, being conscious of something 
doesn’t mean making it an object, but living 
through it objectifying something else. “Over 
and above” this dimension of transparency, 
Legrand puts the sensations lived directly by the 
body, like touching, in which the immediacy 
and closeness of such an experience reveals to 
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us our being a subject. Because of its emerging 
in contact both with itself and with the external 
world, the feeling of touching entails the idea of 
the body as physical and therefore it adds to the 
sense of the self a sense of the space.  
Though its intimacy and self-relatedness, 
the experience of bodily sensations is based on 
the transparency of the body (for this reason 
Legrand defines the bodily feeling as 
“opaque”), since having experience of oneself 
as bodily presupposes having already oneself as 
voluminous, localized, and oriented body. 
While both Gallagher and Vogeley and 
Legrand stress the egoic dimension of living 
differently related to one of its fundamental as-
pects (neurological, social, bodily), Galen 
Strawson proposes an idea of the self freed 
from any other characterization except for its 
being the center of experience: «strip away in 
thought everything other than the being of this 
experience. When you do this, the subject re-
mains».47 Basing upon such essential assump-
tion, the author goes on, according to his usual-
ly bright and fast pace of reasoning, to better 
describe this minimal subject as both a sub-
stance – meant as a thing or object,  i.e. some-
thing existing – and a physical entity – intend-
ed as something existing in a concrete field of 
experience.48  
This recalling to the concreteness of reality 
involves tying the subject to its experiencing 
and it entails in turn identifying the subject 
with its experience, according to a perspective 
that accepts the “venerable tradition” of sub-
ject-object structure without leading to any 
metaphysical (the experienced exists outside 
the subject), ontological (the experiencer differs 
from the content of experience), or phenome-
nological (the experiencer experiences such a 
structure) consequence.  
This close connection between subject and 
experience requires that the existence of the lat-
ter is the condition of the existence of the for-
mer, according to a “thin inner conception” of 
the experiencing subject, which doesn’t con-
ceive of a subject that isn’t actually dealing with 
an experience.  
Following his reasoning developed in easy 
stages, Strawson states that the correlation be-
tween subject and experience is based upon the 
medial term of temporality, in which the sub-
ject’s experiencing goes on; given that «noth-
ing can exist only at an instant»,49 this lapse of 
time has a minimal length, though it is not rele-
vant to determine it exactly. In the same way, it 
is not of primary importance to identify a spe-
cific area of the brain devoted to experience, 
once we assumed that a “neural synergy” per-
forms something like experiencing.  
Because of their common location in the 
brain, one has to affirm the substantial identity 
or, at least, the overlapping between subject 
and experience. In his conclusion, facing the 
insidious objection of considering the non-
experiential being as a part of the experiential 
processes, Strawson reasserts that the proposed 
materialist notion of experience, considering its 
thinness, i.e. its “singleness”, excludes any di-
mension of non-experience as well as any lack 
of a subject of experience.   
The notion of the Self proposed by Straw-
son is partially resumed by John Campbell,50 
who deals with the challenge of defining the 
self as the same person, a difficulty paradoxical-
ly linked to the simplicity of the concept of “I” 
itself. Strictly connected to the first person per-
spective, which constitutes the natural back-
ground of any egological statements, the use of 
“I” is always accompanied by several familiar 
predicates, such as the psychological ones, that 
make the “I-judgement” immune to error 
through misidentification.  
As a consequence, Campbell states: «there 
is no rational basis on which I could hold fast to 
my right to the claim that there is pain, but 
question only whether it is I who has it».51 
Nevertheless, given its autonomy of meaning, 
the notion of the “I” has no fixed term one can 
refer to but itself. Therefore, considering the 
complex mechanism underlying the individu-
al’s life at the physical level, it becomes difficult, 
though necessary, to tie such a mechanism to 
the simple I-dimension.  
The problematic outcome of this reflection 
can lead to the opportunity of denying both the 
first person perspective and even the existence 
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of something like the self.  While the latter pos-
sibility assumes the shape of a no-self theory of 
consciousness,52 the former one is proposed by 
Derek Parfit, explicitly recalled by Campbell 
himself in the conclusion of his essay, who 
clearly criticizes the legitimacy itself of assum-
ing the sameness as a fundamental trait of a 
person.53  
Dealing with examples regarding extreme-
situations – even too radical – of individuation 
of identity such as the replacement of some 
proportion of the body (teletransporation) or 
the implant of her own brain onto the rest of 
the brother’s body, Parfit aims to show how the 
emphasis put on the personal uniqueness is 
merely verbal, since it is based on the consider-
ation of what has to matter according to a the-
oretical standpoint without referring to what is 
really happening. By reducing the importance 
attributed to the identity or, yet better, to the 
linguistic accent of identity, the author suggests 
to shift the attention from the word-level to the 
fact-level, in which what matters is not what we 
can think of it, but rather what we can really 
consider with regard to it.  
To save the sense of identity it is then not 
necessary to aspire to conservation of the same 
“I” over the time, but to expect more modestly 
a partially coincidence of experiences and 
thoughts of the present “I” also in a future, even 
other, “I”. «What matters isn’t that there will 
be someone alive who will be me. It is rather 
that there will be at least one living person who 
will be psychologically continuous with me as I 
am now, and/or who has enough of my 
brain».54 
According to Parfit, the functioning of the 
brain is enough to talk about identity, without 
the need to appeal to an immaterial/Cartesian 
Ego nor to a bodily “I” persisting over time. As 
to the body, in particular, considering the nerv-
ous system as its basic expression, one can put 
the craved sameness in the brain only, since 
«the brain is so important that its survival 
counts as the survival of this human being».55 
According to this openly reductive perspective, 
in the imagined case of the head grafted onto 
another’s body, she can be sure to maintain her 
own identity, because she limits herself to ob-
serve what’s going to happen without any ver-
bal conceptualization on what should be hap-
pen. By doing so, the identity is recognized at a 
minimal level and as such it doesn’t assume the 
primary importance, since it is, as it were, over-
come by the facts.  
Though one has to recognize the rigorous-
ness and the force of the argument proposed by 
Parfit, especially considering his recall to the 
neurophysiological basis of consciousness’ life, 
one should take into account not only the phil-
osophical implications of such reflections, but 
also and, maybe, above all, its ethical repercus-
sions. Campbell does it, as he, at the end of his 
contribution, observes: «ascriptions of psycho-
logical states involving the first person have of-
ten been thought to be essential to the explana-
tion of action. […] The impersonal thoughts 
seem to give no particular reason to feel respon-
sible for what is happening».56  
Thinking of a series of neural processes 
without any subjective center, to which one 
might ascribe or even impute actions, implies 
putting into question the nucleus of any ethical 
philosophy, i.e. the notion of person57. There 
would be no longer a personal identity (it is no 
longer important, in Parfit’s words), but rather 
an identity as a physical process. How is it pos-
sible, then, to recognize such an identity as 
mine, if I cannot talk of me as “I”? According to 
this perspective, what does the mineness of 
identity mean? Should we talk about identity as 
sameness without any reference to who the 
bearer of such sameness is?  
These and similar issues emerge in what 
Jennifer Radden calls the “post-Parfit era”, in 
which any attempt to build a theory of the self 
aims at avoiding «earlier traditions attributing 
identity to the continuity of phenomenological 
states».58 Given that this continuity over the 
time is a neural one, we no longer need a sub-
ject of this continuous proceeding, which goes 
on autonomously. Nevertheless, the complex 
structure of such a process allows trying to 
think of other levels of experience besides the 
mere neural one.  
According to Radden, a possibility in this 
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sense is offered by the case of separate identi-
ties dwelling in the same body. The reference to 
the body, as it is already shown by the essays in 
Fuch’s volume, shifts the attention from a 
simply theoretical idea of the self to the consid-
eration of the praxis the body is an expression 
of. Like Radden states, «embodiment is re-
quired for the sense of identity and personhood 
in which we reflect about what we intend to do, 
and then to act. The body is required for ‘prac-
tical identity’, oneself understood as a doer».59  
Radden quotes two distinct approaches to 
the issue of attributing coexisting multiple 
selves: the one by Stephen Braude, who pro-
poses to read the multiplicity of identity as the 
incapability of distinguishing the claims that 
are indexical and autobiographical from the 
ones that aren’t (one is not able to differ her 
own apperceptive centers from the ones be-
longing to – imaginative - others); and the sec-
ond approach by Carol Rovane, who elaborates 
a weaker sense of multiplicity of the selves that 
permits the co-existence of selves meant as 
“sub-selves” both conscious at the same time in 
the same body.  
Radden presents her own position as closer 
to Braude’s, since she also aims at explaining 
the multiplicity in terms of lack of unity by the 
individual with regard to his/her coexisting ex-
periences. By referring some clinical cases, 
which deal with individuals who experience dif-
ferently a dissociation of personality, Radden 
shows the importance of defining the limits of a 
pathological multiplicity. Contrary to Rovane, 
who stresses the ideal function of self-unity, 
Radden emphasizes the rational and especially 
cultural convenience60 for aligning the coherent 
and uniform self with the healthy state, accord-
ing to a perspective that sees the co-existence of 
some psychic heterogeneity as normal and even 
desirable, provided that they don’t become the 
main trait of personality. In such a view, which 
aims at being a not merely metaphysical reply to 
the skepticism about the idea of the self, «self-
unity and singularities are preconditions for oth-
er valued qualities, traits, and practices».61  
If Radden invites a search for the legitimacy 
of conceiving the self in a broader context than 
the personal, subjective one, Leonard Lawlor 
suggests re-thinking the notion of the self start-
ing by overcoming the longing for identity as a 
basic trait of selfhood.62 Openly referring to the 
theses worked out by Lyotard and successively 
recovered by Deleuze, Guattari, and Derrida, 
Lawlor highlights the bond tying the self and 
time, which doesn’t allow considering the iden-
tity as the constitutive hallmark of the self, like 
the Platonic tradition based on an atemporal 
notion of transcendence requests: «because the 
self is conditioned by time, these philosophers 
[the postmodernists] argue that the self is al-
ways differentiated into past and future. In 
other words, the experience of time shows that 
self-experience does not originate with an iden-
tical self and it does not end with an identical 
self. […] Instead of identity, I find, inside of my-
self, difference».63  
Given that the individual as a self can’t as-
pire to a metaphysical unity, philosophy has to 
seek such a unity in a supra-condition of per-
son, i.e. the political one. Only within a social 
reality capable to develop a non-totalitarian 
“we”, different from the totalitarian “we” of the 
techno-scientific capitalism, it becomes possi-
ble to preserve a singularity. 
The way to the politics passes through two 
very significant authors of philosophy of time 
(and subjectivity), namely Husserl and Berg-
son. Both thinkers, though from diverse stand-
points, developed a concept of temporality that 
makes time a medial structure of mental life, 
which, as absolute, i.e. foundational, deter-
mines the essence itself of the subject meant as 
a reality constantly undergoing an internal dif-
ferentiation. As such, time “consists in a link 
that disjoins as it joins”64 and, by doing so, it 
reveals both its heterogenizing nature and the 
self’s heterogeneous feature.  
It allows escaping from the Platonic per-
spective, at the price of entering into an aporet-
ic dimension, in which the singularity of the 
now – the present – co-exists with the continu-
ation of the flowing – from the past to the fu-
ture. The aporia consists in the fact that the 
present moment, in which according to the 
classic idea one should find the coincidence, i.e. 
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the identity, of the self with his/herself, 
«comes second; it is always involved in a pro-
cess of mediation»65 between elapsed and up-
coming moments. It implies that, if one recog-
nizes in the interior monologue the site of self-
identification (“hearing oneself speak”, in 
Lawalor’s definition of Kantian autonomy), 
one has to admit that such a monologue is basi-
cally characterized by a multi-vocality, since the 
moment in which I guess to hear myself speak-
ing is actually a response to a context surround-
ing and transcending me. Precisely because my 
present speaking occurs within a process al-
ready – temporally - developing.  
The recognition of the fact that «my pre-
sent moment is never immediate, my interior 
monologue is never my own»66 entails the pas-
sage to an over-subjective level of self-
constitution, in which the social trait of narra-
tion plays a crucial role.67 The techno-scientific 
capitalism stood out as a global narrative event 
able to trace any individual formation back to 
the economic rules of gaining time – i.e. gain-
ing capital. As such, capitalism bears the totali-
tarian traits of “power” and “hyperchronism” 
that don’t allow developing independent singu-
larities.  
Without recurring to a reply built on a solid 
and hard subjectivity, which would reproduce 
the Platonic idea of identical – as atemporal – 
self, the postmodernist thought suggests high-
lighting the two marks characterizing the tem-
poral self: the “anachronism”, meant as the im-
possibility to resolve in a fixed unity the aporia 
of the fleeting present, and the “powerlessness”,  
intended as the incapability of not undergoing 
this aporetic condition. The same unstable es-
sence of selfhood allows elaborating a non-
totalitarian response to the totalitarian domain 
of our lives: being aware of oneself as subject to 
time – instead of subject of time – entails forgo-
ing the mastering of first the temporality of ex-
istence and then of the singularities existing 
through temporality.  
Contrary to the capitalist techno-science – 
the ruling narration – postmodernist selves aim 
at building people bound by reciprocal recogni-
tion of weak condition: «this would be a peo-
ple who does the least violence to singularities 
because it is unified around powerlessness».68 
As non-identical and always under construc-
tion, the self, once an obstacle, becomes «a 
spur of thinking», and as such it allows philos-
ophy to write ever more lying in a dimension of 
constant passage. 
Both the volume written by Fuchs and co-
authors and the one edited by Gallagher, given 
their basic differences mainly due to diverse 
starting setting (a general phenomenological 
background adopted in Fuchs’ study, a multi-
plicity of approaches proposed by Gallagher’s 
book), share the need to make clearer an issue 
philosophy in its history dealt with in various 
ways: what does subjectivity look like?  
While Fuchs and his collaborators offer a 
solid reference point for answering, i.e. the 
body and its complex developing, Gallagher 
aimed at presenting many aspects of the issue, 
and in this way he is able to show that for any 
positive account philosophy can propose a 
counter-story can be suggested. In this sense, 
the skeptical contributions put forth by Gal-
lagher – skeptical as regards the issue of subjec-
tivity, and not as to the knowledge – play the 
fundamental role always played by Skepticism 
throughout the history of thought: to not rest on 
gained outcomes, but to move forth reasoning 
and searching (σκέψις) further. The volume by 
Fuchs and co-authors is a very good example of 
such a search as well as various essays presented 
by Gallagher aiming to make the issue of the self 
ever more understandable and rigorous. 
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